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Earman (2018) has recently argued that the Principal Principle, a principle of rationality
connecting objective chance and credence, is a theorem of quantum probability theory. This
paper critiques Earman’s argument, while also offering a positive proposal for how to understand
the status of the Principal Principle in quantum probability theory.
1 Introduction
A particle is approaching a Stern-Gerlach magnet oriented in the x direction. You know the particle
is in the spin-up-z state, ↑z. How confident should you be that an ‘UP’ outcome will be registered?
Answer: you should be 50% confident. Here is one story for why. Knowing the particle is in the ↑z
state tells you that the chance of ‘UP’ is |〈↑x|↑z〉|2 = 1/2. And epistemic rationality demands you
conform your credences to known chances.
The last step in this reasoning is an application of Lewis’s Principal Principle, which says
(roughly) that if an agent knows the objective chance of a proposition E is x, then she should set
her degree of belief in E to x (Lewis, 1980). It is controversial what quantum chances really are,
and if they are objective. But if they are objective, then this looks like a paradigm application of
the Principal Principle.
On the standard way of understanding the Principal Principle, it is a normative requirement
that goes above and beyond other more background constraints on rational credence, like proba-
bilism and conditionalization. While authors have disagreed about whether the principle can be
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independently justified and if so how (Strevens, 1999; Ward, 2005; Pettigrew, 2012, 2013; Childers,
2012; Schwarz, 2014), most agree that an agent can be probabilistically coherent and yet still violate
it. However, Earman (2018) has recently suggested that in the quantum context, the principle:
Quantum Principal Principle (QPP), rough version: if an agent learns that the state of the
system is ψ, then she should set her credence in E to ψ(E), the chance ψ assigns to E,
follows as a “theorem of quantum probability theory” from the usual coherence requirements on
rational credence. Thus, there is no need to seek a further justification of the principle in the
quantum setting, or agonize over which variant of it is correct.1
This paper assesses Earman’s proposal. I first note that on some interpretations, quantum
chances are modeled by ordinary ‘classical’ (Kolmogorovian) probability theory, not quantum prob-
ability theory, and so there is no immediate need for a new treatment of the QPP on these interpre-
tations. On other interpretations, Earman is right to point out that QPP requires its own special
formulation, and that this is an unaddressed issue in the literature. However, I argue, Earman’s
proposed formulation is not the correct one. I lay out what I take to be the correct formulation,
and show that although intuitively true, it does not follow as a theorem.
Before proceeding, it is worth mentioning a further reason that philosophers and physicists may
be interested in the status of the QPP. An important practice within physics is the reconstruction
of unknown quantum states through measurement. This process of quantum state tomography is
one of several methods used to learn and estimate quantum states (Paris and Rehacek, 2004). To
the extent we think of the physicists in these scenarios as rational agents with credences, we may
be interested in modeling their learning experiences as they home in on the unknown state. Here
QPP plays a crucial role. Suppose ψ is the true state of the system and E is some experimental
1Earman’s claim in some ways parallels a claim of Wallace (2012, pp. 150-1) that, specifically in Everettian quantum
mechanics, the Principal Principle can be derived from background constraints on rational credence. One difference
is that Earman’s claim seems intended more generally (though for discussion of the ultimate scope of Earman’s
argument, see Section 3). Another difference is that Wallace assumes further constraints on rational credence beyond
probabilism and conditionalization, related to betting, symmetry and branching (Wallace, 2012, Part II). For reasons
that will become clearer later in the paper, questions of the Everett interpretation will ultimately fall beyond the
scope of our discussion, which focuses on quantum probability theory quite narrowly construed. For discussion of
Wallace’s derivation of the Everettian Principal Principle and the status of the Deutsch-Wallace Born rule theorem,
see e.g. Adlam (2014), Dawid and Thébault (2015), Jansson (2016), Read (2018), Brown and Porath (2020), Wilson
(2020, Ch. 3) and Saunders (forthcoming).
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data. By Bayes’ formula:
C(state is ψ|E) = C(E| state is ψ) · C(state is ψ)
C(E)
. (1)
Crucially, the QPP fixes C(E| state is ψ) to ψ(E). This ensures that the higher the chance ψ
assigns to the observation E, the stronger the true hypothesis is supported. The QPP also helps








ψi(E) · C(state is ψi), (3)
in other words, the agent’s credence in the experimental outcome E is equal to her expectation of
its chance. The overall result is that the agent’s credence in the state hypotheses evolves in the
way familiar from Bayesian statistical inference (cf. Lewis (1980, pp. 285–7)). One of my criticisms
of Earman will be that his formulation of the QPP can’t do the normative work required for this
application to quantum state tomography, and statistical inference more generally. At the end of
the paper, I will show that my formulation can.
2 Earman on quantum chance
In quantum probability theory,2 the objects of quantum chance—what I shall call, for lack of a better
term, the quantum propositions—correspond mathematically to the set of all projection operators
on the Hilbert space of the system in question. Quantum chance functions are then defined as
functions on this set of quantum propositions. They output real numbers between 0 and 1, and
obey similar axioms to classical (Kolmogorovian) probability functions.
In more detail, let H be a separable Hilbert space and let N = B(H) denote the von Neumann
algebra of all bounded operators acting onH. A projection E ∈ N is a self-adjoint element satisfying
E2 = E. Let P(N) denote the set of projections on N. Then a quantum chance function is a map
ω : P(N)→ [0, 1] satisfying:
2Here I follow the presentation of Earman (2018). Cf. also von Neumann (1955), Bub (1977), Hughes (1989,
Ch. 8), Pitowsky (2006), Rédei and Summers (2007), Strocchi (2008, Ch. 2.4), and Hemmo and Shenker (2020).
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i ω(Ei) for any countable collection {Ei} of mutually orthogonal projections.3
Example 1. In the Stern Gerlach case, we can consider the projection P↑x = |↑x〉 〈↑x| corresponding
to the proposition that the ‘UP’ outcome will occur. Since the particle is in state ↑z, the quantum
chance function is given by ω(E) = 〈↑z|E|↑z〉 for all projections E ∈ P(N). One can verify that ω
satisfies both axioms. In addition, ω(P↑x) = 〈↑z| (|↑x〉 〈↑x|) |↑z〉 = |〈↑z|↑x〉|
2 = 1/2 as expected.
We just saw that specifying the quantum state fixes the quantum chance function. It turns out
that when the dimension of H is greater than two, the converse also holds: specifying the quantum
chance function ω uniquely fixes a (normal) quantum state ω : N → C, which we also denote ω.4
If ω is a vector state, in other words if there exists a vector ψ ∈ H such that ω(A) = 〈ψ|A|ψ〉 for
all A ∈ N, then we simply write ω as ψ.
What about credence functions?5 Earman assumes that in the quantum setting, rational initial
credence functions C are also defined over the quantum propositions P(N). Furthermore, Earman
imposes two basic coherence requirements on these functions:
Probabilism (quantum analogue): rational C satisfy the axioms listed above (and hence can
be extended to a normal state C : N→ C, which we also denote C), and
Conditionalization (quantum analogue): rational C obey an analogue of Bayesian updating,
called Lüders updating, which specifies that for all E,F ∈ P(N):6
C(F |E) = C(EFE)
C(E)
, provided C(E) > 0.
3Here ∨ is the ‘join’ operator, the analogue of disjunction: if E1 and E2 are projection operators, then E1 ∨ E2
is the projection corresponding to the closure of Ran(E1) ∪ Ran(E2). Two projection operators are E1 and E2 are
orthogonal when E1E2 = 0. A collection is mutually orthogonal if every pair is orthogonal.
4This follows from Gleason’s theorem and the assumption that ω is countably additive. Here a quantum state is
a normed positive linear functional ω : N → C on N. A quantum state ω on N is normal if there exists a unique
density operator ρω ∈ N such that ω(A) = Tr[Aρω] for all A ∈ N. When H is finite, all states are normal, but this
may not hold in infinite settings (Ruetsche, 2011). When ω is normal, it is common to use ω and ρω interchangeably.
5 I follow Earman in assuming a common Lewisian dualist view of probability, according to which objective and
subjective probabilities both exist and are distinct. In particular, in the quantum setting, we can consider not just
the chances assigned to propositions by the Born rule (which at least appear to be objective), but also an agent’s
subjective credences in those propositions. Of course, as mentioned earlier, it is controversial whether Born rule
probabilities are ultimately objective chances (at least in Lewis’s sense), and arguably the answer depends on which
interpretation of QM we assume. For further discussion of this dualist view in the context of quantum theory, see
e.g. Wallace (2012), Steeger (2019), Earman and Ruetsche (2020) and Myrvold (2021, Ch. 9) (cf. also footnote 11).
6Cf. Bub (1977). Here it is important that C is extended to a state C : N → C, since for F ∈ P(N) that do not
commute with E, EFE may not be a projection operator, thus leaving the numerator C(EFE) undefined otherwise.
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Say an initial credence function C : P(N) → [0, 1] is coherent if it satisfies these quantum
analogues of probabilism and conditionalization. Earman’s main claim is that any such coherent
credence function must automatically satisfy the QPP, thanks to the following result:
Theorem 1 (Ruetsche and Earman (2011) Fact 1). Set-up as above, where we suppose dim(H) > 2.
Let C : P(N) → [0, 1] be any coherent initial credence function. Let ψ be any vector state and let
Pψ ∈ P(N) denote the projection onto the vector.7 Then, provided C(Pψ) > 0,
C(·|Pψ) = ψ(·). (4)
In other words, conditional on Pψ, the credences C must align with the chances ψ.
Based on this result, Earman concludes that the truth of the QPP is not a matter “to be
submitted to the intuitions of wise analytical metaphysicians” but rather one to be proved: “cre-
dence and chance have been brought into alignment without the cudgel of any extra normative
principle” (Earman, 2018, p. 10). Crucially, Earman cannot be accused of “trying to derive an
‘ought’ from an ‘is’” here. His claim is not that a normative principle follows from mathematical
axioms, despite what his slogan “Lewis’s Principal Principle is a theorem of quantum probability
theory” may suggest. Rather, his claim is that a normative principle, the QPP, follows from other
normative principles, Probabilism and Conditionalization, and we can see this entailment clearly
once we appropriately formulate these principles in the setting of quantum probability theory.
Of course, while Earman’s proposal may be safe from Hume’s guillotine, this does not mean it
is safe from all present (philosophical) dangers. Let us now examine Earman’s argument.
3 Examining Earman’s argument
Note that in order for Earman’s result to establish QPP, it is crucial that the projection Pψ represent
the proposition 〈the state of the system is ψ〉, or 〈the chances are given by ψ〉. My main criticism of
Earman’s argument is that this claim is false, and so Equation (4) does not establish the Principal
Principle.
7 Here it crucial that ψ is a vector state, in particular that it is normal (cf. footnote 4) and pure; in ordinary QM,
where N is the von Neumann algebra, the pure normal states coincide with the vector states. Notably, the result
cannot be extended to entangled ω, for instance; see Section 4 for discussion.
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Before elaborating on this criticism, I should clarify an important issue regarding the scope
of Earman’s argument.8 Earman’s choice to model quantum chances using quantum probability
theory—and in particular to define chances over the set P(N) of all projection operators—is not
uncontroversial. Some quantum theories end up privileging a certain subset of commuting operators.
This often brings them into the setting of ordinary ‘classical’ Kolmogorovian probability theory
(Loewer, 1994). For example, in GRW theory, position is given a privileged role. The objective
chances in this theory are the chances attached to spontaneous collapses of the position wave
function. At a given time, the possible states of the world at the next time form the relevant set of
possibilities. Chance is then more naturally represented by a classical probability measure over this
set: it selects which of these disjoint possibilities obtain, with the specific probabilities determined
by the current spatial wave function and the given collapse constant. (Of course, spin and other
degrees of freedom are still subject to chancy jumps, but only insofar as they are entangled with
the spatial wave function.)
Similar remarks apply to Bohmian and Everettian mechanics. Bohmian mechanics is deter-
ministic and so does not involve objective chances in Lewis’s original sense. But insofar as it does
feature a kind of objective chance, it is represented by an ordinary classical measure over initial
Bohmian particle configurations. Again, this is related to the privileging of position in the the-
ory. Similarly, the status of chance in Everettian mechanics is a fraught issue, but to the extent
it features in the theory, objective chance is more naturally represented as a classical probability
measure, this time over disjoint branching possibilities. What makes this possible is the selection
through decoherence of a preferred ‘quasi-classical’ basis over which branching occurs.9
The upshot is that on many quantum theories, standard formulations of the Principal Principle
will carry over, and Earman’s discussion will not apply.10 That said, on other interpretations,
including but not limited to quantum logic interpretations (Stairs, 1983) and information-theoretic
8For similar remarks about the scope of Earman’s argument, see also Brown and Porath (2020, Sect. 5.2).
9For a detailed treatment of Bayesianism and the PP in the Everettian setting, see Wallace (2012, Part II).
10Another interpretation which resists the move to quantum probability theory is Healey’s pragmatist view (Healey,
2017, 2020). On this view, quantum probabilities are relativized to particular physical situations; this relativization
has the effect of singling out a particular Boolean event space, corresponding to a Boolean sub-algebra of P(N), over
which probabilities are defined. Crucially, there is no combined probability over the entire space P(N) (though, as
Healey acknowledges, measures on P(N) are still “convenient devices” for generating objective probabilities on the
Boolean sub-algebras). This resistance to combining is related to the issue of non-contextuality, and in particular
the issue of whether the probability of a projection must be independent of the measurement context. As Brown
and Porath (2020) point out, the quantum probability theory framework (as Earman and others construe it) seems
premised on this assumption, which can be denied.
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interpretations (Bub, 2005, 2016), quantum chances are understood both as objective (or at least
as yielding objective rational prescriptions) and as ranging over all projection operators.11 In these
settings and others, Earman is correct to point out that we need to resituate QPP within quantum
probability theory. Thus, for the rest of this paper, I will assume we are in such a setting.
With these caveats in mind, let us return to my main criticism. In order for Earman’s result (4)
to establish the QPP, it is crucial that Pψ represent the proposition 〈the state of the system is ψ〉.
But there is strong reason to reject this premise. For example, consider a spin-1/2 particle whose
state is entirely unknown. Then the proposition 〈the state is either ↑z or ↓z〉 is contingent, since it
is possible that the true initial state is neither ↑z nor ↓z but rather some superposition of the two.
However, P↑z ∨ P↓z is a necessity; it coincides with the identity operator. More generally, for any
orthonormal basis {ψi}, even though
∨
i〈the state is ψi〉 may be contingent because the true state
may be a superposition of the basis elements,
∨
i Pψi is always a necessity. This suggests that the
projections Pψi do not represent propositions like 〈the state is ψi〉 because they do not have the
right logical structure. To press the point, note that if ψ1 and ψ2 are distinct, we would expect
C(state is ψ1 or ψ2) = C(state is ψ1) +C(state is ψ2), since either the true initial state is ψ1, or it
is ψ2, or it is neither. However, it is well known that we may have C(Pψ1 ∨Pψ2) > C(Pψ1)+C(Pψ2)
when ψ1 and ψ2 are non-orthogonal.
12
In response, one might object that just because 〈the state is ψi〉 is represented by Pψi for all
i, it does not follow that the disjunction 〈the state is ψ1 or ψ2〉 must be represented by Pψ1 ∨ Pψ2 ,
or more generally that
∨
i〈the state is ψi〉 must be represented by
∨
i Pψi . In particular, this step
assumes that the disjunction in the state hypothesis must be interpreted as the join operator ‘∨’ on
the projections (which yields the closure of the union of their ranges), and this assumption could
be denied. Of course, this line of response immediately faces the question of what operation, if not
join, we are supposed to take the ‘or’ to correspond to. At least at first blush, there is no clear
candidate operation, or alternative way of representing these disjunctive state hypotheses, yet we
surely want to say that agents can entertain and assign credences to them.
11There are also views, most notably that of Pitowsky (2006), on which quantum probabilities are understood as
ranging over all projection operators, however they are given a purely subjective interpretation. Since my interest is
in the Quantum Principal Principle, I focus on dualist views of quantum probability (cf. footnote 5). For discussion
of why one might be attracted to a dualist view in this context, see Earman and Ruetsche (2020).
12Cf. Strocchi (2008, p. 51). For instance, again consider a spin-1/2 particle (examples in higher dimensions can
also be given) and let C be the coherent credence function corresponding to the vector state ↑z. Suppose ψ1 = ↑x and
ψ2 = ↓z. Then Pψ1 ∨ Pψ2 = I so C(Pψ1 ∨ Pψ2) = 1, but C(Pψ1) + C(Pψ2) = |〈↑z | ↑x〉|
2 + |〈↑z | ↓z〉|2 = 1/2 + 0 < 1.
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But there is a bigger obstacle for this line of response, which is that the problems with trying
to represent state hypotheses as projections Pψ extend beyond cases involving the join operator ∨.
Imagine that the agent is not sure which of some collection of states {ψi} the system is in, but she is
certain the system is in one of them, so
∑
iC(state is ψi) = 1. For simplicity, suppose this collection
{ψi} is finite and forms an orthonormal basis. Recalling the discussion of quantum state tomography
from the introduction (cf. (2)) we would expect C(E) =
∑
iC(E| state is ψi)·C(state is ψi), i.e. the
agent’s credence in E equals her expectation taken over the mutually exclusive and exhaustive




C(E|Pψi) · C(Pψi), (5)
even though
∑
iC(Pψi) = 1 and the {ψi} are an ON basis, and hence the {Pψi} are partitional.
This is further indication that the projections Pψi do not represent state hypotheses. (For another
similar cautionary tale about the interpretation of projection operators, see also Weinstein (1996).)
Example 2. Consider a spin-1/2 particle (the example can be extended to higher dimensions) and
let the collection {ψi} consist of ↑z and ↓z. Let C be the coherent credence function corresponding
to the vector state ↑x; note that
∑
iC(Pψi) = C(P↑z) +C(P↓z) = 1/2 + 1/2 = 1, as required. Now
let E = P↑x . Then C(E) = 1, but C(E|P↑z)·C(P↑z)+C(E|P↓z)·C(P↓z) = 1/2·1/2+1/2·1/2 < 1.13
An important consequence of this last result is that Earman’s alleged Principal Principle, even




ψi(E) · C(Pψi) (6)
even though
∑
iC(Pψi) = 1. If we do interpret Pψi as 〈the state is ψi〉, as Earman’s formulation
of QPP suggests, then we are led to conclude that C(E) 6=
∑
i ψi(E) · C(state is ψi), even though∑
iC(state is ψi) = 1. In other words, the agent’s credence in E need not match her expectation
of the chance of E.14 But as we saw in the discussion of quantum state tomography (cf. (3)), this
13Here we apply (4) to obtain C(E|P↑z ) = ↑z(E) = 1/2 and C(E|P↓z ) = ↓z(E) = 1/2. More generally, let






ψi. Set C(·) = ϕ(·) and
E = Pϕ. Then C(E) = 1 but
∑









14It is true that given a C, it can always be expressed as C(·) =
∑
i ψi(·) · C(Pψi) for some orthonormal {ψi}.
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is supposed to be a crucial consequence of QPP.
4 Preparation, projective measurement, and a classical analogue
If Earman’s theorem does not establish QPP, then what does it establish?
The theorem establishes that if the system was knowingly prepared in a state ψ by a projective
measurement with outcome Pψ, then rational credence must align with ψ. Indeed this is the gloss
that Earman offers in several places (2018, p. 10, notation adapted):
The intended interpretation of this [result] should be obvious. Suppose that an agent
whose initial credence function on P(N) is C learns that a Yes-No experiment for Pψ
has been performed and that a Yes answer has been returned. Since she is rational she
Lüders updates her credence function to C(·|Pψ). On the objectivist interpretation of
quantum probabilities, the returning of a Yes answer implies that the normal pure state
ψ has been prepared, and, hence, that the objective chance of an event E ∈ P(N) is
ψ(E), which is the same as the agent’s updated credence, C(E|Pψ).
Although interestingly related to QPP, this result is not sufficient for it. There are two main ways
to see that it falls short.
First, note that many preparations do not involve projective measurements (Fröhlich and Schub-
nel, 2016). For example, a scientist can prepare a crystal in its ground state ψ by leaving it in a cold
room. QPP still requires she conform her credences to ψ, even though no projective measurement
took place. Furthermore, it seems that even if no explicit preparation of the system has taken
place—for instance, if a scientist is going to measure some cosmic rays incident on her laboratory
that nobody has interacted with—QPP should still require she conform her credence in accordance
with the expected state. Yet, in these cases, Earman’s result won’t apply.
Second, the result only applies to vector states ψ. But suppose that the system S is entangled
with another S′. If the agent knows S’s state, it seems she should still be required to set her
credences in line with that state. But since the state won’t be pure, the result won’t apply.
However, the issue was whether given any collection of mutually exclusive and exhaustive chance hypotheses, the
agent’s credences equal her expectations over those chance hypotheses. (At the very least, we would expect that if
all the {ψi} assign the same chance α to E, then C(E) equals α. But if the proposition 〈state is ψi〉 is represented
by the projection Pψi then this also fails: note that in the previous example, ↑z(E) = ↓z(E) = 1/2 yet C(E) 6= 1/2.)
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(Indeed, one can check that if ω is not pure, then there does not exist any non-zero projection
P ∈ P(N) such that C(·|P ) = ω(·) for all coherent C with C(P ) > 0 (Ruetsche and Earman,
2011, Fact 1, adapted).) This is a serious restriction considering the ubiquity of entanglement in
quantum theory.15
In fact, focusing on this restriction to pure states, we can see that an exact analogue of Earman’s
Theorem 1 also holds in classical probability theory. Some preliminaries: Let (S,S) be a classical
outcome space, with S a set and S a sigma-algebra on S. Define a state µ as a probability measure
on (S,S). A state µ is pure if it cannot be expressed as a non-trivial convex combination of other
states. One can check that in this classical context, a state is pure if and only if it is a point
measure concentrated at some s ∈ S, which I will write as µs. It follows that the pure states µs
are in one-to-one correspondence with the elements of S. Next, define a projection operator as a
random variable X : S → R that satisfies X2 = X. One can check that every projection can be
expressed as an indicator X = 1J for some J ∈ S, in other words a {0, 1}-valued function:
1J(s) = µs(J) =

1 if s ∈ J
0 if s 6∈ J.
For some pure state ψ = µs we can consider the projection Pψ = 1{s} which tests whether s
′ ∈ S
belongs to {s}. Like in the quantum case, we can also associate Pψ with the claim that a Yes-No
experiment for Pψ has been performed, and that a Yes answer has been returned: Pψ = {s′ ∈ S :
1{s}(s
′) = 1} = {s}. Now, with these preliminaries in hand, we can obtain a classical analogue of
Theorem 1:
Theorem 2 (Classical analogue). Let C : S → [0, 1] be any coherent initial credence function. Let
ψ be any pure state and let Pψ denote the projection defined above. Then, provided C(Pψ) > 0,
C(·|Pψ) = ψ(·).
15Here one could respond that we should move to the composite system Hc = H⊗H′ and consider pure states ψc of
it. But I am considering a case where the agent is only probing S, so there is no “Yes-No experiment for Pψc” being
performed, only Yes-No experiments for propositions of the form P ⊗ I, where P ∈ P(B(H)) and I ∈ P(B(H′)) the
identity. Notably, it follows from the result cited above that if ω is not pure, then there does not exist any non-zero
P ∈ P(B(H)) such that C(· ⊗ I|P ⊗ I) = ω(·) for all coherent C on B(H⊗H′) for which C(P ⊗ I) > 0.
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For proof, recall we can write ψ = µs for some s ∈ S and Pψ = {s′ ∈ S : 1{s}(s′) = 1} = s
where we abuse notation and write {s} as s. Now if C(s) 6= 0, then for all J ∈ S,





1 if s ∈ J
0 if s 6∈ J,
and so C(J |s) = µs(J) = ψ(J) as desired.
Intuitively, what is going on here is that since ψ is pure, Pψ is an atomic proposition that
specifies the exact outcome. Conditionalizing on this outcome, one is forced to align one’s credence
with the post-experiment chance of the outcome, which is either 0 or 1. And so, in this very
restricted sense, “credence and chance have been brought into alignment without the cudgel of any
normative principle.”
Needless to say, while a notable result, this does not constitute a proof of the original Principal
Principle. And as I have suggested here, although its quantum analogue is far more interesting, it
is not a proof of the Quantum Principal Principle either.
This discussion also makes evident the reliance, in Earman’s result, on the choice to focus on the
von Neumann algebra N = B(H), which has atoms. In some quantum field theoretic settings, such
as in the setting of Type-III factor algebras, there are no atoms in the relevant algebra (Ruetsche
and Earman, 2011). The prospect of extending Earman’s treatment to such settings looks dim.16
5 Formulating the QPP in quantum probability theory
I now present my positive proposal for how to formulate the Quantum Principal Principle within
the framework of quantum probability theory. As we’ll see, while the resulting principle is highly
intuitive, it does not follow as a theorem.
We begin by dividing the agent’s credence function C into two components, x and µ. The first
component, x, is what I previously denoted C: it is a function on the set of projections P(N) that,
at minimum, satisfies the coherence requirements from Section 2. The second component, µ, is the
key ingredient that was missing from Earman’s approach. It is a classical (Kolmogorovian) credence
16Crucially, Type-III algebras do not admit any pure normal states. As Ruetsche and Earman (2011, p. 273) point
out, it then follows that no normal states on these algebras have “filters” in the sense described by Theorem 1.
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distribution over the set of possible initial quantum states of the system. Roughly speaking, whereas
x represents the agent’s uncertainty about experimental outcomes associated with the system, µ
represents her uncertainty about the true initial state of the system. If C is coherent, then x and




xωi(E) · µ(ωi) ∀E ∈ P(N), (7)
where we have assumed for now that µ is a discrete distribution over finitely many state hypotheses
{ωi}Ni=1, and that for each ωi, there is a constant xωi(E) which represents the agent’s credence in
outcome E given this hypothesis. The QPP then requires that this credence match the given state:
xωi(E) = ωi(E) ∀i, ∀E ∈ P(N). (8)




ωi(E) · µ(ωi) ∀E ∈ P(N), (9)
in other words, the agent’s credence in an experimental outcome E equals her expectation of its
chance. Extending x to a state by Gleason’s theorem, this is equivalent to the condition that x is
the barycenter for µ (Alfsen, 2012), that is, x =
∑
i ωi · µ(ωi).
Even in this discrete case, we can already see that the QPP is not a theorem of quantum
probability theory, since there are many pairs (x, µ) which are coherent yet violate it. For instance,
fix H with dimension 1 < d < ∞. Suppose x corresponds to a vector state ψ and µ assigns all its
weight to the maximally mixed state ω = I/d. Then the choice xω(E) = x(E) for all E ∈ P(N)
ensures (7). But we have a violation of (8) and (9), since x(Pψ) > ω(Pψ) =
∑
i ωi(Pψ) · µ(ωi). As
I understand the QPP, then, it is a norm that goes beyond usual coherence requirements. Let us
now formulate this norm in full detail.
Fix a separable Hilbert space H and associated algebra of bounded operators N. Let K denote
the set of quantum states on N. This set comes naturally equipped with the weak∗ topology. Let
K denote the sigma-algebra on K generated by this topology. Now we can consider Kolmogorovian
probability measures µ on (K,K). As in Section 2, we can also consider quantum probability
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functions x on P(N). A credence function C is then modeled as a pair (x, µ).
Example 3. In the case of a spin-1/2 particle, µ can be thought of as a probability density over
the Bloch sphere of spin states, and x a point in the sphere. If (x, µ) obeys QPP, then x will be
the ‘weighted average’ of the points supported by µ.
We are interested in how a rational C = (x, µ) changes with new evidence. If the evidence is a




∀F ∈ P(N). (10)
However, to know how C updates, we also need to know how µ updates: after learning E, how
should the agent’s credences in hypotheses H ∈ K about the (initial) state of the state of the system




∀H ∈ K. (11)
In the case H = {ψ}, this is just a more elaborate way of stating Equation (1).
What is the agent’s credence xH(E) in data E given H? Focusing first on the case H = {ω},




xω(E) dµ(ω) ∀E ∈ P(N), (12)
where we have abused notation by writing xH(E) = x{ω}(E) as xω(E). In fact, the generalized
law of total probability also requires that we can express xH(E) for any H ⊆ K as the appropriate






xω(E) dµ(ω) ∀E ∈ P(N) (13)
for all H ∈ K such that µ(H) > 0.





∀H ∈ K. (14)
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Note that µE is determined entirely by the prior distribution µ and terms of the form xω(E). Since
µ is already fixed, the crucial question is, what determines xω(E)?
Enter the QPP:
Quantum Principal Principle (QPP): If C = (x, µ) is a rational initial credence function, then
xω(E) = ω(E) ∀ω ∈ K, E ∈ P(N). (15)
In other words, a rational agent’s credence in an outcome E given the state hypothesis ω
equals the chance of E according to ω.
Importantly, unlike the formulation (4), this formulation applies both when ω is a vector state ψ
and when ω is an entangled state.
Substituting (15) into the expressions above, we obtain several results of interest. For instance,
substituting (15) into (12), we find that the agent’s unconditional credence in E equals her expec-




ω(E) dµ(ω) ∀E ∈ P(N), (16)





∀H ∈ K. (17)
In the special case where H = {ψ} and µ is a discrete distribution over finitely many vector states
{ψi}, this simplifies to:
µE(ψ) =
ψ(E) · µ(ψ)∑
i ψi(E) · µ(ψi)
(18)
which is just a more precise way of spelling out Equations (1)–(3), as desired.
Example 4. A physicist has two identically prepared electrons. She knows they are either in state
↑x, ↑y, or ↑z, and she is equally confident in these three hypotheses. She then measures the first
electron in the spin-z direction and obtains an ‘UP’ outcome. How should her confidences over the
14
hypotheses about the (initial) spin state change? Here we have




The data the agent received is represented by E = P↑z ⊗I. Assuming she obeys QPP, her posterior
credence in the hypothesis ↑z ⊗ ↑z is determined by (18):
µE(↑z ⊗ ↑z) =
(↑z ⊗ ↑z)(E) · 13
1













As expected, the agent’s credence in the ↑z hypothesis increases. A similar calculation shows that,
as expected, her credence in the ↑x and ↑y hypotheses decreases:





























So the agent begins with credence function (x, µ) and ends with credence function (xE , µE), where
xE(·) = x(E · E)/x(E) and µE is specified by the above three equations.
What if the agent then obtains a second piece of experimental evidence F ∈ P(N), say, through
measuring the spin of the second electron? How should her credences over the various state hy-
potheses change? To answer this question, we first need to generalize (17) to obtain an expression
for (µE)F . In particular, we show that for any pair E,F ∈ P(N) with x(E) > 0 and xE(F ) > 0:17
(µE)F (H) =
∫
H∩{ω:ω(E)>0} ωE(F ) dµE(ω)∫
{ω:ω(E)>0} ωE(F ) dµE(ω)
∀H ∈ K. (19)
17First we note that, by (11), (µE)F (H) =
xEH (F )·µE(H)
xE(F )
. So to it suffices to prove that, for all H ∈ K and E,F ∈
P(N) such that x(E) > 0, xEH(F ) ·µE(H) =
∫
H∩D(xE)ω(F ) dµE(ω) where D = {ω ∈ K : xω(E) > 0}. (For then the
QPP implies (xE)ω(F ) = ωE(F ) and D = {ω : ω(E) > 0}.) Since the right-hand-side of this expression is zero when





We can obtain this last expression by inspection from (13). However, for consistency we check that conditioning x





































as desired, where the second equality follows from (13) and the remaining equalities follow from the fact that
xω(EFE) = 0 for ω 6∈ D and (11) implies µ(H) = µE(H) x(E)xH (E) and so dµ(ω) =
x(E)
xω(E)
dµE(ω) for all ω ∈ D.
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In the case where H = {ψ} and µ is a discrete distribution over vector states, this simplifies to
(µE)F (ψ) =
ψE(F ) · µE(ψ)∑
i:ψi(E)>0
(ψi)E(F ) · µE(ψi)
, (20)
which we can apply directly to our question:
Example 4 (continued). The physicist then measures the second electron in the spin-y direction
and obtains a ‘DOWN’ outcome, represented by F = I ⊗ P↓y . How should her credences over the
three hypotheses about the initial state change now? Applying (20), we obtain:
(µE)F (↑z ⊗ ↑z) =
(↑z ⊗ ↑z)E(F ) · 12
1





















By similar reasoning, (µE)F (↑x ⊗ ↑x) = 13 and (µE)F (↑y ⊗ ↑y) = 0. As expected, the ↓y result ruled
out the hypothesis that the electrons were initially prepared in the ↑y state, but did not change the
relative likelihood of the ↑z and ↑x hypotheses.18
One notable feature of the current framework is that it can also be applied to cases where E
and F fail to commute. While (µE)F = (µF )E = µ(EF ) when E and F commute, this does not
hold in general. An interesting case to consider is one in which a rational agent measures a system
and obtains the atomic outcome E = Pψ, updating to (xPψ , µPψ). She then measures it again in
a different basis and obtains the atomic outcome Pϕ, where ϕ ∈ H is non-orthogonal to ψ ∈ H.
What is her final credal state ((xPψ)Pϕ , (µPψ)Pϕ)? Intuitively, one would not expect the agent’s
knowledge of the initial state of the system to improve, since by “disturbing” the system with
her first projective measurement, she has already extracted all the information about the initial
state that she possibly can. Indeed, the QPP entails that the agent’s credences in the initial state
hypotheses do not change upon this second learning experience: (µPψ)Pϕ = µPψ .
19 So, her final
18The other component of the agent’s final credence function is (xE)F . If we assume that H is exhausted by the
spin degrees of freedom of the two electrons, then EF is an atomic proposition Pψ for ψ = ↑z ⊗ ↓y ∈ H, so it
follows from Fact 1 that (xE)F = ψ. Here it is worth emphasizing that while the agent’s posterior over outcomes
is a pure state ψ, her posterior over state hypotheses remains spread out, and in fact does not assign any weight
to the hypothesis ψ ∈ K. That is because ψ ∈ K is a hypothesis about the initial state. As a sanity check,





















reduce to ψ(·). So even if µPψ ’s weight is spread out over various ψj 6= ψ, the ψ(·) will factor out and we will obtain
xPψ = ψ(·) a pure state, as desired. (Here j ranges over all i such that ψi(Pψ) > 0.)
19Here we assume µ is supported by the set N ⊂ K of normal states, that is µ(N) = 1. Then, by (19), (µPψ )Pϕ =
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credal state is ((xPψ)Pϕ , (µPψ)Pϕ) = (ϕ, µPψ). Note that if the order of the learning experiences
were reversed, the final credal state would be (ψ, µPϕ) instead.
To sum up: I have proposed dividing an agent’s credal state into two components, the first
of which, x, encodes her uncertainty about outcomes (her state of ignorance), and the second of
which, µ, encodes her uncertainty about the initial state of the system (her ignorance of states). I
have imposed three main constraints on how x and µ relate. Two of these constraints, the analogue
of Bayes’ formula (11) and the analogue of the law of total probability (13), correspond to familiar
coherence requirements, and do not impose any alignment between the conditional credence xω(E)
and the chance ω(E). The third constraint, however, the Quantum Principal Principle (15), does
impose such an alignment. Like in the classical case, it is not a logical consequence of the Bayesian
coherence requirements, but rather has the status of an additional norm.
What should we make of this alternative conclusion about the status of the QPP? Should we
be moved to pessimism about its validity, now that Earman’s original hope of deriving it looks
dashed? Of course, just because the QPP cannot be derived “as a theorem” from basic coherence
norms does not mean it is false. However, the worry is that if we cannot appeal to other accepted
norms to derive it, then we need some independent motivation for accepting it. Indeed, this worry
may appear even more pressing in the case of the QPP, which looks at first blush like a rather
esoteric norm, involving quantum states and projection operators, that is several steps removed
from our everyday chance reasoning.
I am more optimistic. While far from a full justification, I take it that, even if not part of our
folk chance reasoning, actual epistemic and scientific practice does pay heed to quantum chances
in the way the QPP describes, which lends it some initial motivation. In particular, I have been
emphasizing the connection between the QPP and the practice of quantum state tomography,
which involves the inference of unknown quantum states from experimental data. It is difficult, if
not impossible, to reconstruct those inferences without invoking the principle that the probabilities
given a state hypothesis match the probabilities assigned by the state (remaining neutral, for the
moment, on the metaphysical status of those probabilities). Characteristically Bayesian approaches


























= µPψ as desired,
where we use the fact that µPψ ({ω : ω(Pψ) > 0} ∩N) = 1 and if ω ∈ {ω : ω(Pψ) > 0} ∩N then ωPψ (·) = ψ(·).
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that information in their inference. Indeed, there is a rich practice of Bayesian approaches to
quantum state tomography in which the QPP makes a nearly explicit appearance. In this sense,
the first formulation of the QPP cannot be attributed to me or Earman, but dates back at least to
Jones (1991) (with important precursors by Sýkora (1974), Helstrom (1976), and Hovelo (1982)),
whose approach received further development by Bužek et al. (1998) and Schack et al. (2001), and
enjoys many practical applications today (Granade et al., 2016). (A necessary caveat: while I am
giving a reading in terms of the QPP, some authors who followed and developed this tradition,
such as QBists (Fuchs and Schack, 2004), took quantum states to be subjective, and would object
to the interpretation in terms of QPP and objective chance.) In these works, a version of the
QPP emerges as part of a “natural inversion procedure” that parallels ordinary Bayesian statistical
inference. In fact, my formulation of QPP is continuous with the version that emerges there. To
close the section, I briefly present the framework introduced by Jones (1991), and explain how it
relates to the quantum-probability-theoretic framework developed here.
The Bayesian-tomographic inversion procedure begins by specifying which measurement will
be performed. In particular, we fix a POVM measurement, represented by a collection {Ai}Ni=1 of
positive self-adjoint operators in N summing to the identity I (for simplicity I focus on the finite
case). Note that we can associate with this POVM a Kolmogorovian outcome space (S,S) whose
elements S = {1, 2, . . . , N} represent the different possible outcomes of the measurement. The
inversion procedure then consists of three steps:
1. Define conditional probability values p(i|ω) ≡ ω(Ai) for all i ∈ S and ω ∈ K.
2. Specify a prior distribution µ on the space of possible states (K,K). Then use this to construct
a joint distribution dp(i, ω) = p(i|ω) · dµ(ω) over outcomes and states.
3. Apply Bayes’ rule to p(·, ·) to obtain, for all i ∈ S (cf. (17)):











It should be emphasized that these probability spaces are all Kolmogorovian; the final object p(·, ·)
is a probability measure over the product sigma-algebra (S,S)⊗(K,K). In that sense, this Bayesian
model is different from the quantum-probability-theoretic model presented above. Nevertheless, it
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shares many features, such as the analogue of QPP in step one and the final expression for p(H|i)
in step three. Indeed there is a precise sense in which the two frameworks, and the two versions of
QPP, are related. First, note that while we have been focused on projective outcomes E ∈ P(N),
if C = (x, µ) is coherent and dim(H) > 2, then by Gleason’s theorem, x(·) and xH(·) uniquely
extend to states on N.20 Thus, terms like x(Ai) and xH(Ai) are well-defined even when Ai is not
a projection.21 Furthermore, the properties of a POVM imply that the maps
x(A(·)) : S → C, and xH(A(·)) : S → C (21)
are classical, real-valued probability distributions on (S,S). It then follows that each coherent
(x, µ) gives rise to a unique classical probability measure p(·, ·) on (S,S)⊗ (K,K), defined by:22
p(H) = µ(H), p(i) = x(Ai), p(i|H) = xH(Ai) when µ(H) > 0. (22)
Crucially, this measure coincides with the Bayesian-tomographic distribution defined above when
(and only when) p(i|ω) = ω(Ai) for all i ∈ S and ω ∈ K. And this condition holds, in turn, when
and only when xω(Ai) = ω(Ai) for all i ∈ S and ω ∈ K.23
So: the version of the QPP implicit in Bayesian-tomographic methods is equivalent to a par-
ticular consequence of the version of the QPP proposed here. Whereas the version of the QPP
proposed here requires (by Gleason’s theorem) the alignment of a quantum credence function with
20Here we assume by coherence that, at least when µ(H) > 0, xH : P(N)→ [0, 1] is finitely additive and so can be
extended to a state. In the case of an infinite POVM and thus infinite (S,S), we need that for µ-almost every ω ∈ K,
xω is countably additive, so that composing with the POVM yields a measure on (S,S) that is countably additive.
If (x, µ) satisfies the QPP, then this is equivalent to the requirement that µ is supported by the set of normal states.
21In contrast, a term like xAi(·), where x is conditionalizing on a non-projective outcome Ai ∈ N, is not well-
defined in my and Earman’s framework, because Lüders conditionalization, as we have construed it (10), is only
applicable to projective outcomes E ∈ P(N). This immediately raises the question of how and whether to extend
Lüders conditionalization to POVM outcomes—and what the implications are for the quantum-probability-theoretic
framework if this cannot (or should not) be done. I leave this important issue as a question for future investigation.
22We check that the p(·, ·) defined in (22) is indeed a probability measure. (Note that since (22) specifies p(i×H) =
p(i|H) · p(H) = xH(Ai) · µ(H) and rectangles of the form i ×H generate (S,S) ⊗ (K,K), this p(·, ·) must then also




(S) · µ(K) = 1 using the fact that xH(A(·)) is a
probability distribution. Next, note that the map mi : H 7→ xH(Ai) ·µ(H) is countably additive by (13) and the fact
that µ is countably additive. So p(∪iki i×Hki) =
∑









p(i|Hki) · p(Hki) =
∑
iki
p(i×Hki) which, since (S,S) is finite, implies p(·, ·) is countably additive, as desired.
23Strictly speaking, these conditions are only required to hold for µ-almost every ω ∈ K. To prove that p(i|ω) =
ω(Ai) for µ-almost every ω ∈ K if and only if xω(Ai) = ω(Ai) for µ-almost every ω ∈ K, note that (22) and (13)






xω(Ai) dp|K(ω) for all
H ∈ K. It then follows that the map ω 7→ xω(Ai) is a version of the (classical) conditional expectation for i given K
(Billingsley, 1986, Chapter 6.33), that is, it agrees µ-almost surely with ω 7→ p(i|ω), as claimed.
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a quantum state,
xω = ω, (23)
the Bayesian-tomographic QPP requires the alignment of a classical credence function with a
quantum state composed by a choice of POVM f : i 7→ Ai:
xω ◦ f = ω ◦ f. (24)
While the conditions are distinct, there is a clear logical relation, as (23) entails (24). If we extend
(24) to quantify over all possible choices of f , then the two coincide.
6 Conclusion
How do quantum chances constrain credence? At least some interpretations of quantum mechanics
demand that we recast the Principal Principle within the framework of quantum probability theory.
Earman (2018) sought to do so, and came to a surprising conclusion: the principle follows as a
theorem. In this paper, I started down the same path as Earman, but came to a different conclusion.
The Quantum Principal Principle, appropriately formulated in quantum probability theory, is not
a theorem; its justification does not come so straightforwardly. However, I still found that bringing
the Principal Principle into the domain of quantum probability theory is a worthwhile endeavor.
It not only yields new insight into the principle itself, as Earman showed, it also allows us to bring
the framework to bear on important applications, like the learning of quantum states.
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